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Abstract
Based on empirical findings from a comparative study on welfare state responses to the four
major economic shocks (the 1970s oil shocks, the early 1990s recession, the 2008 financial crisis)
in four OECD countries, this article demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom,
policy responses to global economic crises vary significantly across countries. What explains
the cross-national and within-case variation in responses to crises? We discuss several potential
causes of this pattern and argue that political parties and the party composition of governments
can play a key role in shaping crisis responses, albeit in ways that go beyond traditional
partisan theory. We show that the partisan conflict and the impact of parties are conditioned by
existing welfare state configurations. In less generous welfare states, the party composition of
governments plays a decisive role in shaping the direction of social policy change. By contrast, in
more generous welfare states, i.e., those with highly developed automatic stabilisers, the overall
direction of policy change is regularly not subject to debate. Political conflict in these welfare
states rather concerns the extent to which expansion or retrenchment is necessary. Therefore,
a clear-cut partisan impact can often not be shown.
Introduction
A global economic and financial crisis has been dominating politics across OECD
countries since 2008. In addition to overall macroeconomic and fiscal policy,
social policy schemes have been caught in the currents of the global economic
downturn. Yet, in contrast to what other authors have emphasised (Armingeon,
2013; Farnsworth and Irving, 2012), this article shows that there is typically no
uniform crisis response – such as ‘austerity’ – across countries when it comes to
social policy.1 Instead, policy solutions range from straightforward cutbacks to
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expansionary reform, even in the face of very similar economic conditions. Why
these differences?
This article studies how different crisis responses reflect ideological
differences between political parties. We approach the question of party politics
in times of crisis by examining the link between government composition and
the direction of crisis responses2 in social policy. On average, social expenditure
represents about half of overall public expenditure in the core OECD countries,
which is at times considered to be an excessive burden on public budgets. At
the same time, social insurance and assistance schemes cushion those who lose
out during crisis and function as counter-cyclical macroeconomic stabilisers.
Politically, both the notion of an excessive fiscal burden and the counter-cyclical
effect of crisis responses relate to the overall fiscal and welfare state arrangements
within societies that typically form a key issue of left–right inter-party differences.
The link between the party composition of governments and social policy
crisis management is studied by comparing four small OECD-economies over
a period of about forty years. We specifically focus on short- to medium-
term changes in social entitlements. The direction of change (i.e., expansion or
retrenchment) is measured3 by studying whether important legislative decisions
in response to crisis raised or lowered welfare state benefits, widened or reduced
access to benefits and services or even set up or abolished entire schemes. The
comparative analysis of crisis responses is complemented with qualitative within-
case evidence of the processes of crisis policy-making (see Bennett, 2008; George
and Bennett, 2005).
We use a qualitative measurement of crisis responses rather than social
expenditure data as provided by the OECD based on the fact that the latter
is a problematic indicator for policy change, especially in the short term. If
social expenditure is used, regulatory decisions as well as decisions with a longer
phase-in period are not captured, due to their lack of an immediate impact on
spending (Hinrichs and Kangas, 2003). Moreover, measures of social expenditure
can give a misleading impression on actual policy decisions, as the spending ratio
automatically increases during periods of economic crisis due to higher recipient
numbers of many benefits (particularly in unemployment and social assistance
schemes, if not health and pensions as well) combined with the drop in GDP
(the denominator of the social expenditure ratio). According to recent OECD
data (OECD, 2013), for example, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP saw
a surge from 22.6 to 25.3 per cent, on average, between 2008 and 2009, yet it is
evident that in many countries governments have decided to impose austerity
measures in social policy.4 Therefore, in this article, we look at decisions on the
generosity of and access to social entitlements (‘crisis responses’).
We study Australia, Belgium, the Netherland and Sweden – four cases chosen
to represent different welfare state regimes. They also exhibit a large variation
in the partisan composition of government, both between and within countries.
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TABLE 1. Depth of economic crisis at peak (and year of peak), selected
indicators
First oil shock Second oil shock 1990s recession Financial crisis
Annual GDP growth (nominal, in %)
Australia +1.5 (1977) − 0.4 (1982) − 1.2 (1991) +1.5 (2009)
Belgium − 1.3 (1975) − 0.3 (1981) − 1.0 (1993) − 2.7 (2009)
Netherlands − 0.1 (1975) − 1.3 (1982) +1.3 (1993) − 3.7 (2009)
Sweden − 1.6 (1977) − 0.2 (1981) − 2.1 (1993) − 5.0 (2009)
Unemployment rate (in %)
Australia 6.3 (1978) 10.0 (1983) 10.9 (1993) 5.6 (2009)
Belgium 6.1 (1978) 10.8 (1984) 9.8 (1994) 8.3 (2010)
Netherlands 4.0 (1976) 10.6 (1983) 7.2 (1994) 5.8 (2013)∗
Sweden 2.9 (1978) 4.5 (1983) 11.2 (1994) 8.4 (2010)
Government net borrowing (−) (in % of GDP)
Australia n.a. n.a. − 4.8 (1992) − 4.7 (2010)
Belgium − 7.3 (1978) − 16.0 (1981) − 8.2 (1992) − 5.6 (2009)
Netherlands − 2.9 (1975) − 6.2 (1982) − 9.2 (1995) − 5.6 (2009)
Sweden − 0.6 (1978) − 6.6 (1982) − 11.2 (1993) − 1.0 (2009)
Note: ∗forecast; peak of the crisis is defined as the worst annual performance in the five years
following the global shock (1973, 1979, 1990, 2008).
Source: OECD (2012): Economic Outlook No. 92.
Moreover, Belgium and the Netherlands are founding members of the European
Union (EU) and currently part of the Eurozone, while Sweden only became a
member of the EU in 1995 and has not joined the Euro. Australia, naturally, is
not a member of the EU. Due to the smallness and external vulnerability of all of
these countries, they can be expected to react quickly and decisively to external
shocks (Katzenstein, 1985). We analyse not only the latest crisis, but the four most
significant episodes of international economic shocks over the last forty years: the
oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the early 1990s recession and the on-going global eco-
nomic and financial crisis which started in 2008. While there is no doubt that these
four events had very different causes and characteristics, the depth of the national
crises differed surprisingly little across countries. Table 1 sums up the comparative
extent of the crisis in a highly condensed way by measuring the peak of the crisis
in terms GDP growth, unemployment and public deficits. This demonstrates
a striking uniformity of economic ‘problem pressure’ in the four countries;
exceptions being the relatively good growth performance in Australia in 2009,
and the good unemployment record in Sweden after the oil shocks (see below).5
In developing our argument, we build upon an extensive macroeconomic
literature on automatic stabilisers (Darby and Melitz, 2008; Dolls et al., 2012; in’t
Veld et al., 2013) but, at the same time, go beyond it in an important way. Economic
research tells us that the welfare state has an important effect on economic
performance in the aftermath of crisis via aggregate demand (for a useful
introduction, see in’t Veld et al., 2013). Economists have also analysed the varying
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effects of different public spending schemes and spelt out the conditions under
which automatic stabilisers tend to be more or less effective. There is considerable
evidence showing that the size of the state, especially of unemployment benefits
and related cyclical policies, matters for recovery from economic shocks (e.g.,
Dolls et al., 2012). Our research supports the finding that size, in terms of
generosity of the welfare state, matters. But, in addition, we ask what this implies
for the politics of crisis management. Does automatic stabilisation affect the
political conflict about responses, for example, in the field of social policy?
What happens in countries where automatic stabilisers are small and therefore
less effective? Under what conditions is the lack of automatic stabilisation
compensated for by discretionary fiscal expansion of welfare state schemes?
The argument put forward in this article is that in welfare states with relatively
low benefits and therefore small automatic stabilisers, crisis responses are indeed
shaped by partisan politics. The decision to deal with the crisis by selectively
expanding welfare state schemes or cutting back on benefits is driven by partisan
forces. In the more generous welfare states of Continental and Northern Europe,
by contrast, this partisan effect on the direction of change is very limited or
even non-existent. Since much of the fiscal stabilisation is going on ‘behind the
backs’ of policymakers, through large automatic stabilisers, the overall direction
of crisis response (expansion or retrenchment) is usually not subject to strong
political debate. The direction of change is determined by other factors such as
public debt, supra-national regulation and international influences, or a common
crisis perception. For example, the current crisis shows how the common fiscal
framework of the EU shapes the space for national manoeuvre especially within
the Eurozone. Meanwhile political disagreement is not entirely absent in generous
welfare states, but it concerns the extent of expansion or retrenchment.
In order to substantiate these claims, we first discuss theories of crisis politics
in the light of the literature on political parties and the welfare state. We then
examine whether the depth of the economic crisis and the partisan composition
of government shaped crisis responses in Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands
and Sweden over the last forty years, showing that support for a direct impact
of either differences in the depth of the crisis or political parties is weak, at best.
In the sections that follow, we therefore consider the conditional effect involving
the existing welfare state and assess some alternative explanations. We discuss
the generalisability of our findings and their implications for the literature on
political parties and public policy and point out promising future avenues of
research in the concluding section.
The partisan politics of crisis management
Partisan theories have been highly successful in explaining the development of
the welfare state during the immediate post-World War II decades (Castles, 1982;
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Hicks, 1999; Huber and Stephens, 2001). The basic finding is that social democratic
parties – often supported by trade unions (Korpi, 1983) – have had a positive effect
on the spectacular expansion of welfare states across the OECD. In addition,
Christian democratic parties have had a similar effect on expansion, albeit with
particular emphasis on certain types of policies and modes of provision (Stephens,
1979; van Kersbergen, 1995). Concerning the period after 1970, however, the
results are more mixed (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Huber and Stephens, 2001;
Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Pierson, 1994; Swank, 2002). An
important challenge to partisan theories comes from the so-called ‘new politics’
literature on welfare state retrenchment (Pierson, 1994; see Starke, 2006), which
focuses on the ways in which reform-minded governments – largely irrespective of
partisan composition – are able to conceal unpopular cutback measures through
‘blame avoidance’ strategies. While parties played a subordinate role in Pierson’s
original analysis, they have been moved to the centre in subsequent studies
on retrenchment (Giger and Nelson, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2001; Jensen and
Mortensen, 2014; Kitschelt, 2001). Again, results are much more mixed and more
often sensitive to context conditions than in the older literature on the nexus
between parties and social policy. Note, however, that the ‘new politics’ literature
focuses exclusively on welfare state cutbacks, not on – expansionary as well as
restrictive – crisis responses per se.
What are the expectations regarding the impact of parties on crisis
management? Interestingly, there is very little on this particular issue in the
existing comparative welfare state literature. Nevertheless, left-wing political
parties could be expected to be more favourable towards expansion of the
welfare state during such moments than parties of the right, for at least two
reasons: First, low-income households are particularly at risk during moments
of economic crisis (Ahrend et al., 2011), which is why expanding the welfare state
during crises should benefit these groups more than high-income households.
The opposite holds for crisis-induced retrenchment. We can therefore expect that
left and right parties first and foremost respond to the distributional demands of
their traditional core constituencies of, respectively, low- or high-income earners.
Second, crisis responses are likely to be in line with a parties’ long-term ideological
stance towards (welfare) state and market. Left parties should also be more eager
to blame ‘the market’ and look for state solutions, while parties of the right
should be more willing to blame state regulation or the size of the state. It has
been shown that the salience of economic issues in public opinion is generally
high in the aftermath of crises (Singer, 2011). Moreover, socio-economic policy
positions of parties still shape electoral politics to a great extent. Hence, externally
induced economic crises put some of the most divisive issues of modern partisan
conflicts back on the agenda.
Other theoretical arguments, however, speak against a partisan effect on crisis
responses. During crises, we may witness a suspension of ideological differences
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and a ‘rally round the flag effect’, similar to what has been observed during foreign
policy crises (Mueller, 1970; Oneal and Bryan, 1995). According to the rally round
the flag effect, technocratic governance and the centralisation of decision-making
should be the rule during moments of shock. This ‘crisis centralisation’ thesis
would predict decision-making in small groups involving the executive and a
loss of power of typical veto players (for a critical review, see ‘t Hart et al., 1993).
Moreover, the new politics literature as well as accounts of the post-industrial
politics of the welfare state (Ha¨usermann et al., 2013) would perhaps not expect
a simple left–right divide, either.
The few studies that empirically test the impact of parties on policy responses
to short-term shocks include a quantitative study by Cusack et al. (2008) of sixteen
OECD countries from 1960 to 1995, finding a partisan effect on total government
transfers in response to external shocks. Armingeon (2012) and Wagschal and
Ja¨kel (2010) examine the impact of political parties on fiscal stimulus programmes
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis in twenty-five to thirty-four OECD
countries (plus a few Eastern European states), but they do not find robust
and/or straightforward partisan effects (see also Vis et al., 2011). In line with
the ‘rally round the flag’ effect, Lipsmeyer (2011) finds a diminishing partisan
impact on social expenditure during downturns in seventeen OECD countries
between 1981 and 1998. Jensen (2011) similarly concludes that economic problems
diminish the partisan impact on labour market policies between 1980 and 2002.
He explains this by pointing out that external shocks affect a large share of the
population, including a sizeable proportion of right-of-centre voters. Hence,
conservative and market-liberal parties soften their policies in the aftermath of
shocks. There is some evidence that partisan effects may be real, but dependent
on country-specific factors. In the United States, as case studies show, crisis
responses were strongly shaped by party polarisation (McCarty, 2012), while they
were implemented in a highly consensual way in the Nordic countries (Lindvall,
2012). Overall, the existing evidence on the impact of parties on crisis responses
is mixed, at best.
So far we have assumed that political parties will be able to enact policies
fully in line with their preferences when in government. Yet the impact of partisan
politics may be mediated by institutional or partisan veto players (Tsebelis, 2002).
Again, not many studies exist that test the veto player proposition with respect
to crisis politics. An earlier institutionalist account is Weir and Skocpol’s (1985)
analysis of Keynesian responses to the Great Depression. A more recent study
examining the impact of partisan veto players (i.e., coalition governments), on
fiscal policy in thirty-three parliamentary democracies between 1972 and 2000 is
Blais et al. (2010) who find that ‘[c]oalition governments spend more than single-
party governments when they are in a difficult fiscal context, but they spend less
when the fiscal situation is rosy. It all depends on the fiscal context’ (p. 844).
Note that such findings implicitly contradict the ‘crisis centralisation’ scenario
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TABLE 2. Social policy responses to four
international economic shocks
1973 1979 1990 2008
Australia 0, − + + +
Belgium + − 0 +, −
Netherlands +, 0 − − +, −
Sweden 0, + + − +
Notes: 0= non-reaction, += expansion, – = retrenchment.
A comma denotes several stages in the response.
posited by the crisis management literature (see also Jensen and Mortensen,
2014).
Another factor that features especially in the literature on the 1970s oil shocks
is neo-corporatism (see also Gourevitch, 1986). It has been argued that countries
with highly encompassing trade unions and employer associations were in a better
position to deal with the stagflation crisis. Tripartite bargaining was a way to keep
inflation in check through sustained wage moderation in exchange for policies in
the interests of trade unions. This worked especially when social democrats were
in power and central banks were not in a position to counteract such corporatist
deals (Scharpf, 1991). The role of systems of interest intermediation for crisis
politics more generally – including responses in non-inflationary situations – is,
however, unclear. Before turning to possible interactive effects, we present the
basic pattern of responses in light of the depth of the crisis and the partisan
composition of government.
Economic conditions and the partisan composition of government
The social policy responses across all four episodes and countries are described
in detail in the web appendix to this article (see supplementary material) and
summarised in Table 2.6 The table depicts expansionary crisis measures with a
+, cutbacks with a – and non-responses with a 0. It reveals that the picture
of responses is highly diverse. This picture contradicts what common notions
of either a general ‘return of the state’ or a new ‘age of austerity’ would lead
us to expect.7 The immediate responses to the latest crisis show an initial
similarity in policy responses (expansionary). Subsequently, however, some of
the countries changed course, while others did not – a result that is not in line
with unidirectional expectations.
How can this diversity of social policy responses to crisis be explained? The
depth of the crisis turns out to be a relatively weak predictor of crisis responses.
First of all, it must be noted that economic performance is a partly endogenous
factor. The depth (and length) of the recession in Sweden in the early 1990s, for
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example, is probably in part due to the significant expenditure cutbacks. Just like
the relatively mild and short downturn in Australia in 2009 cannot be understood
without reference to the stimulus program, one of the largest, earliest and most
effective in the OECD (OECD, 2009: chapter 3).
Surely, some countries that were economically particularly hard-hit also
reacted with wide-ranging measures, such as Australia and Sweden in the
early 1990s. Both countries experienced the deepest recession in decades and
responded with decisive reform (i.e., broad cutbacks in Sweden and stimulus
and policy innovation in Australia). But it is often overlooked that Sweden was
also heavily affected in the 2009 downturn – with a drop in GDP of 5 per cent
and unemployment rates above the OECD average – but reacted very cautiously
and incrementally. The Netherlands implemented cutbacks in the early 1990s,
although it was not ‘in crisis’ by conventional standards, while Belgium, which was
deeply in trouble, did not react in an unequivocal manner. Hence, the relationship
between the depth of the crisis and the responses across the countries can be called
very weak, at best, a finding that is also confirmed by other studies (Armingeon,
2012; Bermeo and Pontusson, 2012). More importantly, the depth of the crisis
does not tell us much about the direction of responses, as the divergence between
Australia and Sweden in the early 1990s demonstrates. As a consequence of an
international shock, the nature of the crisis was broadly similar across countries
in each period, but responses often went in completely different directions.
Perhaps genuinely political factors played a role in the decision to either
cut back or expand welfare state schemes (or not change them at all). In order
to provide a first overview of the association between parties and specific crisis
responses, we match the partisan composition of government in the first years
after an economic shock on the social policy responses briefly summarised
above. Table 3 exhibits the partisan composition of governments in the different
countries and at different times of major international crisis, and the respective
direction of social policy change (in terms of expansion, non-reaction and
retrenchment, see also Table 2). The theory should lead us to expect expansionary
responses under left governments and retrenchment when secular conservative
(‘right’) or liberal parties are in office.
The impact of the partisan composition of governments on the direction
of policy responses to crisis seems clearest in Australia. Here, after a first non-
reaction in the face of high price inflation, the conservative Fraser government in
the late 1970s followed the slogan of ‘Fight Inflation First’ and cut back benefits.
After the change in government in 1982, Labor used expansion as part of a
corporatist bargain to deal with the crisis, and did so again in the early 1990s.
Even after the financial crisis of 2008, expansionary policies were used by Labor.
What is more, after each shock, the conservative opposition argued against the
government’s expansionary measures and proposed fiscally conservative alterna-
tives. For example, in 1991, the conservative opposition launched a radical policy
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TABLE 3. Political parties and crisis responses
Direction
of social
Prime Partisan policy
Country Crisis Period minister composition change
Australia Oil shocks 1974–1975 Whitlam (II) Left 0
1975–1983 Fraser (I–IV) Right −
1983–1987 Hawke (I–II) Left +
1990s recession 1990–1992 Hawke (IV) Left +
1992–1996 Keating (I–II) Left +
Financial crisis 2007–2010 Rudd Left +
since 2010 Gillard (I–II) Left +
Belgium Oil shocks 1974–1977 Tindemans (I–III) CD–Liberal +
1977–1978 Tindemans (IV) CD–Left–Liberal +
1978–1979 Vanden CD–Left–Liberal +
Boeynants (II)
1979–1980 Martens (I–III) CD–Left–Liberal +
1980–1981 Martens (IV) CD–Left +
1981 Eyskens CD–Left +
1981–1987 Martens (V–VI) CD–Liberal −
1990s recession 1991–1999 Dehaene (I–II) CD–Left 0
Financial crisis 2008–2009 Van Rompuy CD–Liberal–Left +
2009–2011 Leterme (II) CD–Liberal–Left +
(+caretaker)
since 2011 Di Rupo Left–Liberal–CD −
Netherlands Oil shocks 1973–1977 Den Uyl Left–CD +
1977–1981 Van Agt I CD–Liberal 0
1981–1982 Van Agt II CD–Left 0
1982–1986 Lubbers I CD–Liberal −
1990s recession 1989–1994 Lubbers III CD–Left −
Financial crisis 2007–2010 Balkenende IV CD–Left +,−
2010–2012 Rutte Liberal–CD −
Sweden Oil shocks 1973–1976 Palme III Left 0
1976–1982 Fa¨lldin (I–III) Centre–Right +
1990s recession 1991–1994 Bildt Centre–Right −
1994–1996 Carlsson III Left −
Financial crisis since 2006 Reinfeldt (I–II) Centre–Right +
Note: CD = Christian democratic; 0 = non-reaction, + = expansion, – = retrenchment. A
comma denotes several stages in the response.
blueprint, entitled ‘Fightback!’, which, among other things, called for a shake-up
of the industrial relations system, cuts to health care and strict time limits for
unemployment benefits. Similar dynamics occurred after 2008 (see below).
In contrast, we find such partisan differences only to a very limited extent in
Belgium and the Netherlands. To be sure, in Belgium and the Netherlands, the
early 1980s were a time when partisan conflict over the design of savings measures
became somewhat stronger and shifts in the ideological composition of cabinets
to the right (in the Netherlands in 1982 and in Belgium in 1981) led to the first
clear welfare state cutbacks. Yet these ‘turning point’ events were exceptions
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rather than the rule. Later on, left-wing and conservative parties were involved
in both cutbacks and expansionary responses. In the Netherlands, for example,
unemployment insurance was cut back in the early 1990s by a government of
Christian Democrats and Labour. And the socialist-led broad coalition of Elio Di
Rupo in Belgium introduced cutbacks in pensions and unemployment insurance
in 2011/12.
In Sweden, the pattern is even less partisan in nature. Following the second
oil shock in the early 1980s, conflict between parties revolved around measures
in health policy and unemployment insurance, which, however, were rather
symbolic (such as a waiting day for sickness benefits). In the 1990s, retrenchment
became the order of the day in fighting massive deficits. Though there was political
conflict across left–right party lines, there was general agreement about the need
for cutbacks. The expansionary policies carried out by a centre–right government
during the most recent crisis period were equally broadly supported across the
political spectrum.
The conditioning impact of welfare state generosity
How can we explain the differential impact of the partisan composition of
governments on the social policy responses to the crisis in Australia on the
one hand, and the European countries on the other? We argue that the crucial
conditioning factor for the uneven impact of parties is the generosity of the
welfare state. In highly developed welfare states, much of the stabilisation happens
behind the backs of political actors when automatic stabilisers are ‘quietly doing
their thing’ (Cohen and Follette, 2000). Hereafter we will show evidence at the
aggregate as well as the within-case level to support our explanation.
Starting at the aggregate level, Table 4 shows that Sweden holds the title of the
OECD welfare champion, both in terms of total social expenditure and overall
generosity – measured with the composite generosity score calculated by Scruggs
(2008),8 while Australia is the laggard (by a considerable margin). Belgium and the
Netherlands are not far behind Sweden, although there are important differences,
especially when it comes to social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Looking
at particular welfare state schemes, such as public pensions, unemployment and
sickness benefits, Sweden loses some of its special status, as the Netherlands
and Belgium catch up on or even overtake the average Swedish generosity values
(measured in terms of average replacement rates). Australia, however, consistently
retains its status as one of the least generous welfare states in the OECD.9
As we have shown, the pattern of left expansion versus right retrenchment
was most pronounced in Australia, and much less so in Europe. The extent
of automatic fiscal adjustment through social policies in Australia is limited.
Virtually all benefits are means-tested and flat-rate. As a consequence, people
who lose their jobs but have other income are often not entitled to unemployment
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TABLE 4. Welfare state characteristics, twenty-one countries, 1973–2007
Total gross Average Average Average
public social pension sick pay unemployment
expenditure replacement replacement replacement Overall
(% GDP) rate rate rate generosity
Australia 14.4 0.39 0.46 0.45 19.6
Austria 26.1 0.76 0.82 0.63 27.5
Belgium 25.8 0.79 0.87 0.64 31.4
Canada 17.4 0.58 0.68 0.68 24.2
Denmark 26.1 0.56 0.72 0.72 36.0
Finland 25.3 0.60 0.77 0.59 31.2
France 26.5 0.61 0.62 0.66 29.7
Germany 24.9 0.70 0.98 0.67 28.6
Greece 17.2 . . . .
Ireland 16.4 0.46 0.54 0.54 22.8
Italy 21.9 0.73 0.78 0.22 22.0
Japan 14.0 0.58 0.53 0.61 17.8
Netherlands 23.4 0.54 0.82 0.82 35.1
New Zealand 18.9 0.50 0.50 0.48 25.7
Norway 22.2 0.58 0.95 0.68 38.6
Portugal 15.5 . . . .
Spain 19.7 . . . .
Sweden 29.9 0.66 0.89 0.81 41.2
Switzerland 16.8 0.48 0.82 0.75 26.7
United Kingdom 19.1 0.49 0.38 0.41 19.3
United States 14.5 0.65 0.00 0.62 18.7
Mean 20.7 0.59 0.66 0.61 27.6
Sources: Social expenditure data was taken from the OECD SOCX database (years 1980 to
2007) (OECD, 2009). Overall generosity scores and replacement rates for the years 1973
through 2002 taken from Scruggs (2006). Scruggs reports replacement rates for families
(sick pay and unemployment) or couples (minimum and standard pensions), and for singles.
Assumed earnings are those of the ‘average production worker’. Average replacement rates were
constructed by taking the average of the replacement rates for singles and for families/couples
for each year; numbers in table represent averages of these numbers over all years.
benefits. Those who are, receive a flat-rate social assistance-type benefit, which
over the last forty years was, on average, considerably lower than the OECD mean
and just over half the average Swedish or Belgian level (see Table 4). In the absence
of automatic stabilisers, the question of stimulus was put on the political agenda
each time the economy was in trouble. By contrast, in Continental and Northern
Europe, including Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, generous welfare states
imply larger automatic fiscal stabiliser effects (Dolls et al., 2010; Girouard and
Andre´, 2005). Social insurance programmes such as unemployment benefits lead
to an automatic counter-cyclical expansion of public spending on social policy
in times of crisis not only because average benefit levels are much higher, but also
because they are often universal and earnings-related. There is therefore much
less need for discretionary stimulus measures.
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A look at the typical instruments used in response to crisis also suggests
that crisis responses can have different functions, depending on the policy
context. In Australia, expansionary responses usually involved raising benefit
levels (especially in the early 1980s) and paying lump-sum payments to a large
group of beneficiaries (1990s, 2008). In the other three countries studied, such
‘macroeconomic’ short-term measures aimed at lifting aggregate household
demand are almost entirely absent. Instead, regulatory instruments targeted at
specific vulnerable groups such as older unemployed or those hit by redundancies
are more common.
Having shown that the content of crisis responses is shaped by the presence
or absence of large automatic stabilisers, we will now turn to the within-case
evidence for the kind of conditional impact welfare state generosity can have
on the politics of crisis responses. In Australia, whenever stimulus measures are
called for, the government cannot rely only on the welfare state to quietly do
its job without much debate. Therefore, the question of whether and how fiscal
expansion should be implemented has to be put on the legislative agenda. Once
it is out in the open, the issue of discretionary fiscal stimulus via welfare state
benefits – versus no fiscal stimulus or fiscal stimulus via taxes and infrastructure
spending, for example – must be debated in parliament. This is where the long-
standing ideological positions of parties come into play, as the Australian crisis
debates amply illustrate. In this process, each party tends to advance its ‘pet
policies’. The most recent crisis is a case in point. Labor Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd stated in October 2008 that:
it is very important to act early and decisively. If you are to learn anything from economic
history it is this: at a time when economies need stimulus support, don’t leave it too late. (Rudd
and Swan, 2008)
Welfare sceptical secular conservative parties such as the Australian Liberal
Party and their traditional ally, the National Party, tend to shy away from using
the welfare state as crisis manager in this sense. Although initially supportive,
the opposition quickly turned and voted against the second stimulus plan in
parliament in early 2009. The leader of the conservative opposition Malcolm
Turnbull then stated:
The opposition will vote against this package in the House and in the Senate . . . We know that
this is not going to be a popular decision, but it is the right decision. The Prime Minister has
made one easy decision after another. He has not made a hard decision since he took up that
high office. But somebody has to stand up for what is right. Somebody has to stand up for fiscal
discipline. Somebody has to stand up for the taxpayers of Australia and ensure that we do not
impose staggering levels of debt on future generations. (Turnbull, 2009)
In the same speech, he called the first stimulus of 2008 a ‘cash splash [which] did
not work’ (ibid.). And again, in 2011, the Liberal opposition leader criticised the
government for making ‘the fundamental mistake of thinking that a crisis largely
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caused by too much spending and too much borrowing could be addressed
by yet more spending and yet more borrowing’ (Abbott, 2011). Not that the
conservatives were entirely against fiscal expansion, but they tried to get tax cuts
rather than social and infrastructure spending on the agenda.
By contrast, in Continental and Northern Europe, where generous social
insurance programmes lead to an automatic counter-cyclical expansion of public
spending, crisis responses have been more modest. An example is the response
to the 2008 financial crisis in the Netherlands. Already in November 2008, Prime
Minister Balkenende emphasised that it was essential that ‘automatic stabilisers
can do their job’ without political interference.10 In spring 2009, the centre–left
coalition government (Balkenende IV) announced its crisis response package.
In the accompanying document, it was, again, emphasised that ‘automatic
stabilisers already stimulate the economy significantly’.11 Therefore, the package
included only some targeted social policy measures, such as the expansion of
part-time unemployment benefits and the establishment of ‘mobility centres’ for
job seekers.
Similarly, in Sweden in 2008 the government was able to rely on an
extensive system of social protection, and subsequent governments were careful
to preserve its stabilising functions. The crisis package enacted by the centre–right
government was expansionary. In addition to investing in active labour market
policies, cutbacks were circumvented by means of avoiding the so-called ‘pensions
brake’12 to become effective. As the crisis was relatively quickly overcome, Swedish
policy-makers across the political spectrum emphasised how well the country’s
automatic stabilisers had functioned in preventing a deeper crisis and declared
they were going to prevent any future shocks.
Constrained partisanship in generous welfare states
It is certainly not the case that political debate is absent in more generous welfare
states. Yet examining the typical kind of post-crisis debate in these countries
serves to strengthen rather than contradict our argument on the conditioning
impact of welfare state generosity. While in Australia, the political debate typically
revolved around the overall direction of crisis responses – i.e., expansion versus
retrenchment, social transfers versus other instruments of crisis management –
the debate in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden was marked by the question
of how much – stimulus or retrenchment – is enough. Note that this is not
an argument about the depth of partisan conflict but rather about the type of
conflict unfolding in the aftermath of economic shocks under different contextual
conditions.
In Sweden, for example, social policy crisis management certainly did not
occur without intensive political debate, particularly with regard to retrenchment
in the 1990s and the resulting discussion about the possible ‘end of the Swedish
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welfare state’ (Lindbom, 2001). Significant cuts to social benefits and services
resulted, with parts of these hotly debated between political parties, but in effect
the policies enacted by changing governments appeared rather coherent. There
was a general agreement about the type of response, the necessity of retrenchment
following a ‘basic TINA logic’ (Steinmo, 2002: 841). Similarly, following the global
crisis beginning in 2008, there was a debate about the extent of social policy
expansion, however there was no major struggle on the overall direction of crisis
management.
In Belgium, we see a comparable pattern, where expansionary crisis responses
were often driven by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, in concert with
the social partners in the 1970s. When the fiscal situation worsened after the
second oil shock, the issue of welfare state cutbacks entered the agenda and was
most forcefully supported by the Liberals and, to some extent, the Christian
Democrats. In general, retrenchment was limited in Belgium (at least in the
immediate aftermath of economic shocks). But it did sometimes emerge and did,
at times, involve left parties, most recently in late 2011, when the Socialist-led
government of Elio Di Rupo introduced incremental welfare state cutbacks even
against trade union opposition. It should be noted that the measures taken by
the Di Rupo government were certainly influenced by the fiscal requirements of
the EMU, to which we will return below.
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, we also see a general agreement
about the need for cutbacks in the Netherlands. Yet there is strong disagreement
between political parties about the extent of retrenchment (Holsteyn, 2010: 415).
This is clearly visible in the electoral campaign of 2010. In all party manifestos
(except for the Socialist Party), we find a commitment to decreasing budget
deficits. Yet while the Liberal Party favoured extensive cuts in social policy and
health care, the Labour Party advocated much more moderate cutbacks (CPB,
2010).
When looking at medium-term differences, it should be emphasised that
large automatic stabilisers have the consequence that, ceteris paribus, they increase
the deficit. Of course, the idea of countercyclical stimulus is to stabilise economic
growth rates in the medium term and thereby also to reduce the deficit. But,
especially when economic recovery does not follow quickly, the short-term
hike in the public deficit figures often provokes calls for cutbacks later on. For
example, in the Netherlands and Belgium, the oil shocks of the 1970s led to a
sharp increase in public expenditure on social policies. After implementing some
targeted expansionary measures in the 1970s, in the 1980s there was agreement
in both countries that public deficits had reached their limits and should be
addressed.
The interplay between automatic stabilisers and retrenchment in the medium
term becomes particularly visible in the social policy response to the 2008
financial crisis. As we saw above, in the Netherlands, the centre–left (Balkenende
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IV) government’s crisis response package of March 2009 explicitly emphasised
automatic stabilisers and added only some temporary and targeted stimulus
measures. At the same time, the government announced cutbacks in pensions,
health care and childcare, which were later implemented by a new centre–
right government (Rutte I). In the period after 2009, we see a broad agreement
across the political spectrum on the necessity of social expenditure cuts in the
longer term. This agreement is part of a long Dutch tradition of welfare state
retrenchment in times of economic difficulty, started in the 1980s. In addition, it
was reinforced by the fiscal requirements of the European Stability and Growth
Pact (made even stricter in 2011).
Similarly, in Belgium, at first, the automatic response – supplemented with
some additional labour market measures – worked well after the economic shock
of 2008. Despite this, fiscal policy became a major political issue. The deficit
peaked at 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2009 and gross public debt hit 100 per cent of
GDP in 2010 (OECD, 2012). In late 2011, the financial markets and the European
Commission put enormous pressure on Belgium to solve the political crisis and
introduce fiscal savings measures. In December, a six-party coalition headed by
socialist Elio Di Rupo was formed and immediately unveiled an austerity package
which included sizeable pension cuts and plans to cut back unemployment
benefits for some groups. As in the Netherlands, expansion was thus followed by
retrenchment, largely independent of the partisan composition of government,
but directly related to the EU’s fiscal requirements. In sum, the Netherlands and
Belgium are examples of countries where initial – mostly, though not exclusively
automatic – expansion gave way to retrenchment under the conditions of high
overall debt levels and the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. These
conditions were absent in Sweden and Australia.
Potential alternative explanations
We have already discussed the limited explanatory relevance of associating
the differences in social policy responses with differences in the depth of
the crisis. But what about other alternative explanations for the pattern we
see? Regarding the structure of political institutions, all four countries are
characterised by a moderate to high number of institutional and partisan
veto players. Political power-sharing and fragmentation is particularly strong in
Belgium and the Netherlands, due to frequent and broad coalition governments,
and also in Australia.13 Concerted policy-making in Sweden was, in part,
determined by the fact that the governments during crisis episodes were all
minority governments (with the brief exceptions of Fa¨lldin I and II and Reinfeldt
I). While the specific institutional arrangements differ, cross-party consensus
requirements exist in all countries and lead to friction and, as a result, compromise
costs. A general argument based on institutional restrictions of government
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decision-making fails to account for the striking diversity of responses both
across time and across the four countries.
Is it, then, the presence or absence of multi-party cabinets – which are, after
all dominant in Continental Europe – that explains why the partisan effect is
stronger in Australia? Does the fairly regular and clear change in government that
we see in Australia account for the policy pattern? This is not fully convincing,
either (nor is it uncontested in the literature – Jensen and Mortensen, 2014;
Pierson, 1994). Multi-party cabinets cannot explain why the direction, and not
just the magnitude, of responses have differed so much across time and space, nor
can they explain why partisan conflict in Australia has revolved mostly around
the overall direction (i.e., expansion versus retrenchment), while in Europe, the
conflict between political parties – parties sharing office as well as government
and opposition parties – has been rather about the extent of expansion or
retrenchment. Here, an explanation taking welfare state generosity into account
fares much better.
If it is not institutional and partisan veto players, then it is perhaps interest
groups, and corporatism in particular, that play a role in shaping crisis responses.
Again, there is no straightforward association between the direction of change
and the strength of corporatism. Only in the 1970s and 1980s do we find a pattern
according to which sustained expansion of welfare state schemes was dependent
on the ability of the government to keep wages in check. In Sweden, corporatist
coordination was still largely intact at that time, but both the Netherlands and
Belgium showed strong signs of disintegration. Many initial reactions to the first
oil shock were still very much in the corporatist mould, but over the 1970s and into
the 1980s, relationships between the government, employers and trade unions
grew more conflictual. Consequently, the disintegration of classic corporatism
made further expansionary measures increasingly difficult, given the inflationary
pressures at the time of the second oil shock. In Australia, the quasi-corporatist
Accord of 1981 – which did not include employers – supported expansionary crisis
responses, but the Wassenaar Accord in the Netherlands that was concluded in
1982 between employers and unions heralded the beginning of important cut-
backs. Neither agreement was corporatist in the sense of Scharpf’s (1991) analysis
of social democratic crisis politics; nor was the result in terms of social policy mea-
sures the same. During the 1990s financial crisis, the role of classical corporatism
was almost non-existent. Trade unions, for example in Belgium, were arguably
capable of vetoing wide-ranging retrenchment by threatening massive strikes, but,
overall, responses were not fundamentally influenced by interest group politics.
Finally, an important factor that has surely constrained the impact of political
parties on crisis response is membership in the European Union, more specifically
the Eurozone. Especially during the most recent crisis episode in Belgium and
the Netherlands, the requirements of the European Fiscal Compact limited the
possibilities for expansionary policy change, at least in the medium term. Yet
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it is questionable whether EU budgetary requirements really altered the overall
direction of policy change. After all, Swedish public finances have fared better
in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, meaning that Sweden would not have had to
implement cutbacks even if it had been part of the Eurozone. And while Belgium
switched to cutbacks only when explicitly pushed by the European Commission
(and financial markets), in the Netherlands, cutbacks were already scheduled as
part of the (initially expansionary) crisis package of early 2009, well before the
EU’s budgetary requirements even became an issue. In both countries, however,
the extent to which welfare state schemes were to bear the necessary cutbacks
was debated between political parties. In conclusion, Eurozone membership has
been shown to have had a reinforcing influence under very specific conditions in
Belgium and the Netherlands and must therefore be added to the explanation,
but it does not explain the overall pattern across all countries and crisis episodes.
A systematic analysis of the exact impact of EU and Eurozone membership on
the direction of crisis responses would, however, have to include a larger selection
of countries. This task is beyond the scope of this article.
Conclusion
In this analysis, we found strong variations in social policy responses to economic
crises. Indeed, some of the policy differences between countries are due to
idiosyncratic reasons. We have tried to account for these as much as possible.
Some broader patterns remain, however. We have argued that the generosity of
the welfare state matters for the type of partisan conflict that dominates during
moments of crisis. With regard to crisis-related expectations of a partisan impact
on policy responses, our research neither fully supports the partisan view of crisis
management nor the expectation of a depoliticised ‘rally round the flag’. In less
generous welfare states, partisan strife to an important extent determines the
direction of policy change, while in more generous welfare states there is a ‘rally
round the flag’, but only in relation to the general direction of policy change.
Although we have tried to select OECD cases with a high degree of
representativeness, it will be important to empirically test this hypothesis with
other cases to fully assess its generalisability. There is already some evidence
that the pattern of partisan responses in less generous welfare states is not
confined to Australia. Similar dynamics can, in fact, be observed in the United
States and in Britain. In a study on the politics of the US stimulus after the
financial crisis, Nolan McCarty (2012) concludes that ‘[i]deological rigidity and
polarization limited the policy response in many important ways. On fiscal
policy, the government response became quickly ensnared in age-old partisan
divisions over tax cuts, social spending, public investment, and deficits’ (p. 226).
In Britain, the initial response under Labour was expansionary, but not primarily
in the area of social policy as was the case in Australia. Partisan differences in the
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importance of social cushioning became much sharper after the 2010 election,
when the Conservative–Liberal coalition introduced wide-ranging retrenchment
measures (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011). Questions about the value of social
benefits and the primacy of austerity shaped the debate in the UK. Conversely,
the crisis responses of other generous welfare states, such as Germany and the
Nordic countries, seem to follow the expected bipartisan agreement about the
direction of change (Lindvall, 2012).
Our findings about the conditional impact of parties on crisis policy-making
have larger implications for comparative welfare state research. Parties do matter
but in times of crisis, the dynamics of partisan conflicts are strongly influenced
by the role of welfare states as macroeconomic stabilisation mechanisms. We
believe that, in general, the cyclical aspect of social policy has not found the
attention it deserves. Therefore, more detailed work is needed on the exact
cyclical determinants and effects of various welfare state instruments – cash
transfers versus social services, passive versus active benefits and universal versus
means-tested payments – or the role of policy learning during crises.
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Notes
1 Granted, Armingeon argues that austerity has become the only game in town only from 2010
onwards. However, his main argument is still about policy uniformity, not variation.
2 Crisis responses are understood in terms of policy change along the continuum of expansion
and retrenchment.
3 This qualitative analysis is based on primary sources such as government declarations and
elite interviews, comparative economic statistics, and the available secondary literature; more
detail is provided in the web appendix as well as a monograph on the topic (Starke et al.,
2013).
4 The calculation is based on data for 21 ‘core’ OECD countries (see Table 4 for the list of
countries). The average social expenditure ratio hovered around 25 per cent of GDP in
2010–12, which is significantly above the historical average of recent decades.
5 Inflation needs to be mentioned, too, as it was a central aspect of the oil shocks but, with the
exception of Sweden, did not play a major role in the later crises.
6 Social policy responses to crisis refer to legislative changes in the fields of pensions, passive
and active labour market policy, social assistance, family policy and health care which were
linked to the economic downturn. Instead of analysing outcome indicators such as social
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expenditure, the dependent variable here is government choice (see Klitgaard and Elmelund-
Præstekær, 2013 for a similar measurement approach). We focus on intentions to change the
social rights of citizenship (see Stephens, 2010 for an overview), in other words, eligibility
and entitlement rules for benefits (transfers and social services). This excludes changes in
funding and administration of welfare state schemes. All crisis reactions have been coded
as expansion (+), retrenchment (–) or non-reaction (0). Table 2 reflects the predominant
direction of policy change for each crisis episode and country. Further details can be found
in the web appendix to this article (see supplementary material).
7 It is important to note here that the analysis focuses on short- to medium-term responses
only, taking place in the first few years after the shock. Whether or not global shocks can
be regarded as watersheds for long-term welfare state trajectories is a different – and highly
speculative – question beyond the scope of this article.
8 Social expenditure and overall generosity are closely related (r = 0.8).
9 Francis G. Castles has argued that, historically, Australia – and New Zealand, for that
matter – were laggards only with respect to the formal welfare state. At the same time,
they had an additional system of ‘social protection by other means’, in the form of trade
protectionism and strong labour market regulation, in particular (Castles, 1985, 1989).
10 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2008–2009, 31 371, Nr. 54, p. 11.
11 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2008–2009, 31 070, Nr. 24, p. 6; authors’
translation.
12 The reformed Swedish pension system includes an automatic adjustment mechanism
(‘bromsen’) to maintain the balance. If it comes to a decline in pension reserve funds,
the pension indexation is automatically reduced.
13 Only during the late 1970s did the Australian government briefly have a majority in the Senate.
Usually, the government therefore had to negotiate with smaller parties and independents
for a legislative majority. The constraints on government were thus as real as in the other
countries.
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